

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

January 30, 2020

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RECEIVED
POLICE COMMISSION
2020 JAN 30 AM 9:49

TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE (NON-TACTICAL) FID NO. 008-19

RECEIVED
JAN 31 2020
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Unintentional Discharge (UD), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 008-19. On January 15, 2020, this case was presented to the Chair of the Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) who considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident and made recommendations as to the outcome.

I have adopted the recommendations from the Chair of the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On April 3, 2019, at approximately 0905 hours, Officers F. Edwards Gay, Serial No. 40087, and J. Alcantar, Serial No. 41703, West Valley Patrol Division, were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white police vehicle. The officers responded to the termination of a vehicle pursuit that resulted in a multi-vehicle traffic collision at the intersection of Balboa Boulevard and Vanowen Street.

According to Officers Edwards Gay and Alcantar, upon their arrival to the intersection of Balboa Boulevard and Vanowen Street, they observed numerous vehicles involved in a traffic collision, including a gray Toyota Tacoma pickup truck that matched the description of the suspect's vehicle. They were directed to the Tacoma where two additional suspects remained inside.

Note: The investigation revealed that before the officers approached the Tacoma, the driver had already fled on foot and was taken into custody, away from the vehicle. The two additional suspects remaining in the Tacoma were identified as M. Munoz, who was trapped in the front passenger compartment of the vehicle and J. Dagan, who was seated behind the driver's seat, in the rear passenger compartment.

Additionally, the investigation determined that the Non-Tactical Unintentional Discharge (NTUD) occurred separately from the pursuit, traffic collision, Non-Categorical Use of

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Force, and crimes associated with this incident. Investigations were completed by other department entities and were not part of the scope of this investigation.

Additional officers and supervisors, including Sergeants K. Spence, Serial No. 32990, L. Martinez, Serial No. 31179, E. Yates, Serial No. 34832, and Officer C. Hill, Serial No. 40479, West Valley Patrol Division, responded to the termination of the pursuit.

According to Officer Edwards Gay, she approached the Tacoma and opened the rear passenger compartment door. She *immediately* observed Dagan in the *back seat*, nearly *falling* out, so she *grabbed* him by the shirt to keep him from falling and advised him *not to move* (**Additional – Profanity**).

According to Officer Alcantar, the scene was *chaotic*, and he broadcast a request for multiple Rescue Ambulances (RA) before assisting Officer Edwards Gay in *holding* up Dagan. (**Additional – Preservation of Life**).

According to Officer Edwards Gay, Dagan had *lacerations* and was bleeding from the head, so she *switched positions* with Officer Alcantar since she was not wearing protective gloves. After retrieving gloves from her police vehicle, Officer Edwards Gay returned to the Tacoma and she *realized* that the engine was *still running* and that the vehicle had not been *cleared*. After she *opened* the driver's side door, she *leaned in* to turn off the engine *and* observed that the *dashboard* was *completely obliterated* with the *steering column*, *split* from the dashboard. Officer Edwards Gay observed the *wooden handle* of a *gun*, *wedged* between the *steering column* and the *dashboard*.² Knowing that Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel would be *coming in and out of the car* to extricate Munoz and Dagan, and fearing that the *gun* was within *reach* of Munoz, Officer Edwards Gay felt it was safer to *take the gun out*. Believing that the space was *too tight to grab hold* of the *entire gun*, Officer Edwards Gay *reached in* with her right hand and *gripped* the *handle* with her *thumb and index finger*. Officer Edwards Gay *pulled it* once and it *didn't come out*. She *tugged it again*, causing one round to be discharged from the revolver. Officer Edwards Gay heard a *pop* and *let go* of the gun. (**Unintentional Discharge**).

A review of Officer Edwards Gay Body Worn Video (BWV) by FID investigators revealed that she reached into a depression between the dashboard and steering column with her right hand. Officer Edwards Gay appeared to make a slight tugging motion away from the dashboard. Then she made a second tugging motion away from the dashboard followed by a slight movement of Officer Edwards Gay's right arm inward toward the dashboard. The sound of a single gunshot immediately followed. Officer Edwards Gay immediately removed her right arm away from the dashboard of the Tacoma.

² The *gun* which Officer Edwards Gay observed inside of the vehicle was determined to be a Smith and Wesson, Model 49 blue steel revolver, in .38 caliber, with a five-shot capacity. The investigation determined that the revolver was loaded with four .38 caliber cartridges at the time of the NTUD. A subsequent analysis by Forensic Science Division Firearms Analysis Unit determined the gun had a shrouded hammer capable of being cocked and placed into single action fire or double action fire mode. The weapon was determined to function as designed.

According to Officer Alcantar, Officer Edwards Gay briefly walked away and when she returned, he asked her to *cut off the side curtain airbag* from the driver compartment. Officer Edwards Gay opened the driver side door and *moments later* Officer Alcantar *heard a pop*. Officer Alcantar's view of the driver compartment was obstructed by the *airbag and frame* of the Tacoma. He believed the sound was from Officer Edwards Gay *needing to pop* the airbag or from a *delayed response* of an *airbag* deploying. Approximately *two minutes later*, Officer Edwards Gay advised him that there was a *gun in the dashboard*.

The investigation revealed that at the time of the NTUD, due to the ongoing tactical incident, Munoz was being covered by a Topanga Patrol Division officer who was positioned outside of the front passenger door. Neither Munoz, nor any other officer, was in the path of the discharged round.

According to Officer Edwards Gay, she was unsure if the revolver had discharged or if an *airbag* had deployed. She advised Officer Alcantar that there was a *gun in the dashboard* before returning to the driver's compartment and *easing* the revolver *out* with her right hand. She attempted to *download it*; however, the *barrel was stuck*. Officer Edwards Gay *asked another officer* to try to *download* the gun, but he was not able. She took possession of the revolver once again and secured it in the *trunk* of her police vehicle. Officer Edwards Gay then notified *Sergeant Spencer* and *Sergeant Martinez* that the *gun went off* while she was trying to *take it out* (**Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

Note: A review of Officer Edwards Gay's BWV by FID investigators revealed that initially, she only notified Sergeant Spencer that the gun had discharged.

According to Officer Hill, he was on the passenger side of the Tacoma *speaking with Munoz*, when he heard a *muffled bang*. Officer Hill believed it was the sound of an *airbag* deployment and walked towards the front of the Tacoma where he met Officer Edwards Gay who looked *surprised and panicked*. Officer Hill looked down and observed that Officer Edwards Gay was holding a *firearm in her hand*. Officer Edwards Gay later said to him, "*It went off. I was trying to get it out of the dash, and it went off.*" Officer Edwards Gay handed him the revolver. Officer Hill attempted to unload the revolver and *render it safe* by depressing the *chamber release*, however it was *jammed*. He advised Officer Edwards Gay to secure it in her police vehicle (**Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

According to Sergeant Spencer, upon his arrival, he began to *manage the crime scene*, which included a *use of force, major collision, and a pursuit investigation*. He was approached by Officer Edwards Gay who advised him that she *may have had a discharge, but she was very unsure of what had happened*. Sergeant Spencer believed that the revolver was still in the vehicle and walked with Officer Edwards Gay to the Tacoma where she had located the revolver. He was advised by Officer Edwards Gay of the *direction* that the *muzzle was pointed* at the time of the discharge. Due to his *concern* for any *people* in front of the Tacoma, he *canvassed* the area in front of the vehicle for *victims* with negative results. Additionally, he met with Sergeant Martinez and briefed him on the *possibility* of a *negligent discharge* (**Command and Control**).

According to Sergeant Martinez, he approached Sergeant Spencer to assist him with *assessing* the scene and requesting resources. Sergeant Spencer advised him of the NCUOF and that a separate *AD* (Accidental Discharge) had occurred (**Command and Control**).

According to Officer Edwards Gay, she walked back to the trunk of her police vehicle with Officer Alcantar and advised him that the revolver was *jammed*. She removed the revolver from the trunk and handed it to Officer Alcantar (**Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

According to Officer Alcantar, he was advised by Officer Edwards Gay that she had not been able to *render* the revolver *safe* because she believed it was *stuck*. Officer Edwards Gay directed him to the trunk of their police vehicle where Officer Alcantar took possession of the revolver. In the *interest of public safety*, and lack of a *lock box* to *secure* the revolver, Officer Alcantar *opened the cylinder* and unloaded the revolver. Officer Alcantar observed it to be a *five-cylinder revolver* with *four rounds in it*. One round had the *primer punched* (**Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

A review of Officer Alcantar's BWV revealed that upon opening the cylinder of the revolver, he made the statement, "*I got it. That one's been shot.*" Officer Alcantar placed the revolver into the trunk of the police vehicle.

According to Officer Edwards Gay, Sergeants Spencer and Martinez approached the back of their police vehicle as Officer Alcantar unloaded the revolver. Officer Edwards Gay advised Sergeant Martinez that it was *probably likely* that the *gun had gone off* in the *dashboard*. Officer Edwards Gay took possession of the *rounds*, placed them and the *gun in a rubber glove*, and secured them in the trunk of their police vehicle. Officer Edwards Gay was then directed by Sergeant Spencer to *ride with Dagan to the hospital* (**Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

According to Sergeant Martinez, he approached Officer Alcantar as he was *clearing the weapon* near their police vehicle. Officer Edwards Gay began *telling him something* as Sergeant Martinez *got distracted* directing personnel and requesting additional resources to follow the suspects to the hospital.

According to Sergeant Spencer, he walked to the trunk of Officer Alcantar's police vehicle to *ensure* that the revolver was being *secured and learned* that it was being *unloaded*. He *briefed* Sergeant Martinez on the *use of force, pursuit* and informed him of a possible *discharge*, and that *Officer Edwards-Gay was involved*. Sergeant Spencer was *distracted* with trying to *manage* the *scene* and did not obtain a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer Edwards Gay. Sergeant Spencer observed *three unspent cartridges*, and *one spent cartridge casing* in Officer Alcantar's *open right palm*. At that time, he formed that *opinion* that a NTUD had occurred, and that Officer Edwards Gay was involved. Additionally, the coordination of transporting the suspects to various hospitals was taking place. In an effort to facilitate the medical transports, he *assigned* Officer Edwards Gay to travel with one of the suspects to the hospital (**Command and Control**).

According to Officer Alcantar, while in the RA, he *realized* that the incident should probably be an *FID callout*. Upon their arrival to the hospital, he directed Officer Edwards Gay to *call* the *watch commander* to advise him of the incident. In an attempt to adhere to Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) protocols, Officer Alcantar advised Officer Edwards Gay that they *can't talk anymore* and for her to *step outside* to monitor for any telephone calls.

According to Sergeant Yates, he arrived at the scene and was directed by Sergeant Martinez to respond to Northridge Hospital Medical Center to *separate two officers*, one of which was *involved in a non-tactical discharge* and to obtain a *Public Safety Statement*. Upon arrival, Sergeant Yates ensured Officer Edwards Gay was separated and monitored.

On April 18, 2019, Criminalist D. Rubin, Serial No. G9077, Forensic Science Division, tested the revolver and found that the revolver and ammunition to be functional.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officer Edwards Gay.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Does Not Apply.

Unintentional Discharge – Administrative Disapproval, Negligent Discharge, Officer Edwards Gay.

ANALYSIS³

Detention

Does not apply.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: "*The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance*" (*Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05*).

Officer Edwards Gay's tactics were not related to the NTUD that occurred during this incident; therefore, they were not reviewed or evaluated. However, as Department guidelines require personnel who are substantially involved in a CUOF incident attend a Tactical Debrief, I have determined that it would be appropriate to recommend a Tactics finding of Tactical Debrief.

³ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

During the review of this incident, the following Debriefing Point was noted:

- Firearms Manipulations – Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, Officer Edwards Gay did not have direct interaction with the suspect while attempting to retrieve the revolver. It was determined that the NTUD was a separate occurrence from the other activities that were occurring; therefore, Officer Edwards Gay was not evaluated for tactical de-escalation.

Command and Control⁴

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

⁴Training Bulletin-Command and Control was adopted by the Department July 31, 2018, after this incident occurred.

Sergeant Spencer responded and began to manage the scene, which included a vehicle pursuit, severe traffic collision, and a NCUOF. Shortly thereafter, Officer Edwards Gay advised Sergeant Spencer that the revolver had discharged, but Sergeant Spencer was distracted due to his role in managing the scene. Sergeant Spencer failed to order Officer Edwards Gay to not discuss the incident and did not ensure that she was separated and monitored. As a result, Officer Edwards Gay was left unattended and the revolver was allowed to be manipulated and moved numerous times. Additionally, he directed Officer Edwards Gay to travel to the hospital with a suspect.

Sergeant Martinez responded and assisted Sergeant Spencer with assessing the scene and requesting resources. Sergeant Martinez was informed by Sergeant Spencer that a NCUOF and a NTUD had occurred.

According to Sergeant Martinez, when Officer Edwards Gay approached him Sergeant Martinez became focused on *making sure* that *resources* were assigned to accompany the *suspects to the hospital*. Sergeant Martinez, upon review of his BWV, realized that when Officer Edwards Gay attempted to inform him that the revolver had discharged, he became *distracted* and *turned away*.

The UOFRB noted that upon arrival, Sergeants Spencer and Martinez were faced with numerous factors, including a brief vehicle pursuit, severe traffic collision, multiple injured victims and suspects requiring transportation to local hospitals, and a NCUOF. While Sergeants Spencer and Martinez were monitoring the radio, and conducting an assessment of the incident in an effort to gain situational awareness, they allowed themselves to become distracted, causing the information communicated to them by Officer Edwards Gay regarding the discharge of the revolver to become lost in their attempts at scene management. Being overcome by distractions resulted in a breakdown of communications between the supervisors themselves and with the officers. The culmination of this delayed the requisite following of categorical use of force protocols in a timely and expeditious manner, a Department expectation of its supervisors. The supervisors did take responsibility during their interviews, acknowledging the shortcomings upon post-incident evaluation.

I recognize this was a chaotic situation and acknowledge that the attention of both supervisors was divided by crime scene management and resource coordination. This contributed to the delay in the post-OIS separation, monitoring, and PSS protocols. My expectations of Department supervisors include taking control of complicated events or scenes, and the ability to provide clear direction to officers, while prioritizing critical components of the incident. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that the deficiencies in the incident management by Sergeants Spencer and Martinez fell short of Department expectations and their respective future performance would be significantly improved by training specific to command and control of multi-tiered critical incidents.

Sergeant Yates responded to Northridge Hospital Medical Center and obtained a PSS from Officer Edwards Gay. Sergeant Yates also ensured Officer Edwards Gay was separated and monitored.

The actions of Sergeant Yates were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

I will direct that the topic of Command and Control, and my expectations of supervisors during critical incidents, be specifically addressed with Sergeants Spencer and Martinez during the Tactical Debrief.

Tactical Debrief

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Sergeants Spencer and Martinez, along with Officer Edwards Gay, attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On April 18, 2019, Officer Edwards Gay attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including Firearms Manipulations.

Unintentional Discharge

Firearms safety is critical. Officers must have the ability to draw, holster and manipulate weapons safely at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Firearms safety rules have been established based upon real life situations and are applicable at all times. Violations of any of the safety rules will not be tolerated.

The Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules

1. *All guns are always loaded.*
2. *Never allow the muzzle to cover anything you are not willing to shoot.*
3. *Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are aligned on the target and you intend to shoot.*

4. *Be sure of your target.*

Officers are required to know and apply the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules throughout their careers. These rules must be ingrained into an officer's natural thought process and become second nature. Any violation of the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules may result in the unintentional discharge of a round. This is a serious matter with the potential of having tragic results. For administrative purposes, the unintended discharge of a weapon is classified into two categories:

1. *Accidental discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a mechanical malfunction of the firearm, not involving the shooter.*
2. *Negligent discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a shooter not handling a weapon in a safe manner, violating one or more of the four basic firearm safety rules (Los Angeles Police Department Firearms Manual, July 2015).*

Administrative Disapproval - Negligent Discharge. *Finding where it was determined that the unintentional discharge of a firearm resulted from operator error, such as the violation of a firearm safety rule (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

Officer Edward Gay – .38 caliber, one round in a Northeast direction

According to Officer Edwards Gay, after she opened the driver's side door, she leaned in to turn off the engine and observed that the dashboard was completely obliterated with the steering column, split from the dashboard. Officer Edwards Gay observed the wooden handle of a gun, wedged between the steering column and the dashboard. Knowing that Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel would be coming in and out of the car to extricate the Munoz and Dagan and fearing that the gun was within reach of Munoz, Officer Edwards Gay felt it was safer to take the gun out. Believing the space was too tight to grab hold of the entire gun, Officer Edwards Gay reached in with her right hand and gripped the handle with her thumb and index finger. Officer Edwards Gay pulled it once and it didn't come out. She tugged it again, causing one round to be discharged from the revolver. Officer Edwards Gay heard a pop and let go of the gun.

Officer Edward Gay recalled,

I knew that once Fire, like the Fire Department came in, they'd be climbing inside the car. There would be -- there were a lot of people around, so I just wanted to make sure to make it safe for everyone in the area... So I open the front driver seat. And when I lean in, and the dash -- the dashboard is completely like obliterated. There is -- the steering column is down. The dashboard is like split open from the wreckage. And inside where the steering column should be, wedged inside, I see the handle of a gun. So I reach in and I try to pull the gun out. I don't -- I can't see the barrel. I can just see the handle. So I grab it with kind of -- I

just kind of grab it and pull it. It doesn't come, I pull it again, and there's a pop. And so I let go of the gun.⁵

The gun was wedged in -- in between the dashboard and the steering column with the handle out. I couldn't see the barrel or anything else. Just the handle. So I reached out with my right hand with one hand and just gripped the -- just the -- the wooden handle and tugged it. When it didn't come, I tugged it again, and it went off. Just a few fingers because it was so -- just there wasn't enough space for me to grab with my whole hand the entire gun.⁶

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the circumstances and evidence related to this incident. Upon reviewing the evidence, the UOFRB determined that the UD was the result of operator error. After Officer Edwards Gay's first attempt to pull the revolver out from the depression between the steering column and the dashboard, the revolver did not dislodge. She tugged on it a second time, followed by a slight movement inward towards the dashboard. Immediately following the slight inward movement, the sound of a single gunshot could be heard.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Edward Gay's action violated the Department's Basic Firearm Safety Rules, and therefore requires a finding of Administrative Disapproval (AD), Negligent Discharge. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional

Profanity – The investigation revealed that Officer Edwards Gay used profanity directed towards Dagan. The profanity was determined to be a single utterance and did not escalate the incident. Captain E. Eskridge, Serial No. 24585, Commanding Officer, West Valley Area, was advised and addressed this issue through divisional training. The Commanding Officer of Operations-Valley Bureau (OVB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Preservation of Life – The investigation revealed that after initially approaching the suspect vehicle, Officers Alcantar and Edwards Gay recognized that Dagan was significantly injured and was partially falling out of the vehicle. Even though the tactical incident was continuing, Officers Alcantar and Edwards Gay took steps to support Dagan's upper body to avoid him further injury or pain.

Categorical Use of Force Protocols – The investigation revealed that on numerous occasions, Officers Edwards Gay, Hill, and Alcantar moved the revolver during the incident. Captain Eskridge was advised and addressed this issue through divisional training. The Commanding Officer of OVB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

⁵ Officer Edwards Gay, Page 32, Lines 18-22; Page 12, lines 19-25; and Page 13, lines 1-4.

⁶ Officer Edwards Gay, Page 20, lines 9-21.

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force Incident – The investigation revealed that Sergeants Spencer and Martinez, upon being informed of the NTUD, did not immediately ensure Officers Edwards Gay was separated and monitored. Captain Eskridge was advised and addressed the issue through divisional training. The Commanding Officer of OVB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/Body Worn Video – West Valley Patrol Division and Topanga Patrol Division vehicles were equipped with DICVS; however, none captured the NTUD. West Valley Patrol Division and Topanga Patrol Division officers were equipped with BWV at the time of the incident. Officers Edwards Gay's BWV captured the NTUD. Officer Alcantar's BWV captured the sound of the NTUD.

Respectfully,



MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 1-30-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No.	CF No.	DR No.
008-19		
OIS - NT Unintentional Discharge		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident Vanowen St and Balboa Blvd	RD 1028	Date of Incident April 03, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review January 15, 2020 1100 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members: 		
Member (Office Representative)			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau)			
Member (Bureau)	<i>RECEIVED JAN 31 2020 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL</i>		
Member (Peer)			
Presenting Commanding Officer			
Notes:	<i>RECEIVED 2020 JAN 30 AM 9:49 POLICE COMMISSION</i>		
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<input type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: <u>01/30/2020</u> <input type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: <u>01/30/2020</u>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Edwards-Gay, Facion		Serial No. 42753	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 008-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 5 months	Current Division West Valley	Time in Current Division 0 years, 10 months		
Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission		
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
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Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		

Notes:

Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/Administrative Disapproval Finding
<input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.